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Abstract
This paper examines the equilibrium incentive for firms to use behavior-based price
discrimination in a duopoly market with exogenous switching costs. We find that if there is a
large difference in the existing market shares between two firms, then discriminatory pricing
is a unique Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, there are three Nash equilibria: both firms engage in
discriminatory pricing, or engage in uniform pricing, or engage in mixed strategies. The
respective firms are worse off in the discriminatory equilibrium compared with the others.
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There are several studies that deal with competitive discrimination with exogenous switching 
costs (Bester and Petrakis, 1996; Shaffer and Zhang, 2000; Chen, 1997, and Taylor, 2003). 
However, except for an analysis of spatial pricing policies by Thisse and Vives (1988), to the 
best of our knowledge, the firms’ pricing policies are assumed, and there is little discussion on 
whether the respective firms do in fact select a strategy of carrying out price discrimination. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the equilibrium incentive for firms to use 
behavior-based price discrimination. Thisse and Vives (1988) shows that under oligopoly 
competition firms may have unilateral incentives to engage in price discrimination. In direct 
contrast to this, our novel results show that there are multiple equilibria depending on the 
existing market share.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 
analyzes the determination of the prices in a mature market where each firm has already 
established a market share. We conclude in Section 4. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
We describe the competition of firms in a market with exogenous switching costs. Suppose that 
there are two firms, A and B, who produce products A and B, respectively, with constant 
marginal cost  . Each consumer can consume either a unit of product A or a unit of product B, 
but not both. Total number of consumers is normalized to one. We assume that the consumer’s 
reservation price is so high that in the equilibrium, all consumers will use one of the products. 
We consider competition in the period after all consumers have purchased some products. Let 
c
α  denote the market share of firm A in the previous period, and  α − 1  that of firm B.       
During the current period, the two firms sell new products with the same features and 
quality, and all consumers buy the new products that are now provided. At this time, in cases 
where given consumers switch to the other firm, the switching cost   must be borne by these 
consumers. We assume that the switching cost   is uniformly distributed across the consumer 
population on the interval 
s
s
]    , 0 [ θ  with density  θ 1 . To ensure the equilibria (specifically, to 
satisfy the second-order conditions), it is assumed that  2 9 0 < <θ . We normalize  1 = θ  
without loss of generality. 
It is assumed that the products of these respective firms are homogeneous. For this reason, 
the consumers consider only the price and the switching costs   when selecting goods. There is 
a cut-off 
s
ij s  such that among the consumers who have bought from firm i in the previous period, 
all consumers with 
ij s s >  continue to buy from firm i, and all consumers with 
ij s s <  switch to 
buy from firm j, where   and  B A j i   ,   , = j i ≠ . Then, the number of consumers    ) 1 (
AB s − α  
continue to buy from firm A, and the number of consumers 
AB s α  switch from firm A to firm B. 
Similarly, the number of consumers ) 1 )( −α (1  
BA s −  continue to buy from firm B, and the 
number of consumers 
BA s ) 1 ( α −  switch from firm B to firm A.  
The structure of the game is as follows. We consider a two-stage game, with simultaneous 
moves in each stage. In stage one, the firms decide on their pricing policy. That is, they can 
exercise price discrimination or uniform pricing. In stage two, knowing each other’s pricing 
policy, the firms choose the price and consumers make their purchase decisions. If a firm 
chooses a price discrimination policy in stage one, then in stage two it can set different prices of 
 for its own previous (original) customers and   for new customers who switch away from 




i p = i
  10 = α or  1 = α , then it is not possible for any firm to exercise price discrimination for its 
previous customers and new customers. Thus, in this paper, we consider a situation in which 
both firms have their own previous customer, i.e.,  1 0 < <α .  
 
3. The Equilibrium 
As a result of the selections of pricing policy by the two firms in stage one, four cases are 
possible: (DP, DP), (UP, UP), (DP, UP), (UP, DP). Here, “DP” indicates discriminatory pricing 
and “UP” indicates uniform pricing. Thus, for example, “(DP, UP)” indicates that firm A is 
using discriminatory pricing and firm B is using uniform pricing.  
We examine equilibrium prices in stage two for each of these respective cases. Firstly, we 
consider the subgame in which both firms carry out discriminatory pricing (DP, DP). The 
consumer who has bought from firm i in the previous period is indifferent between continuing 
to buy from firm i and switching to buy from firm j, if her switching costs s  satisfy the 
condition . For this reason, the cut-off becomes  s p
j
N + p
i = 0 ) ( 0
j
N
i ij p p s − = . There exist some 
switchers from firm A to firm B and other switchers who switch from firm B to firm A. It can be 
easily seen that in the equilibrium 0 . Here, provided that 
, each firm’s profit ( ) in this period is given by: 
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Each firm i maximizes its profits   with respect to its current prices, taking the market shares, 
i π
α α − 1   ,  in the previous period, and the other firm’s prices as given. From the conditions of 
profit maximization we can derive the Nash equilibrium. 
Secondly, we consider the subgame in which both firms carry out uniform pricing (UP, UP). 
When  , switching from firm A to firm B will occur, and the cut-off becomes 
B A p p ≥
) (
B A p p −
AB s = , but switching from firm B to firm A will not occur, therefore,  0 =
BA s . The 
profits of firm A and B ( and  ) in this period are given by: 
A π
B π
)}( ( ) 1 {(  UP)
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Each firm i maximizes its profits   with respect to its price, taking the market shares, 
i π α α − 1   , 
in the previous period, and the other firm’s price as given. From the conditions of profit 
maximization we can derive the Nash equilibrium. 
For the cases of (DP, DP) and (UP, UP) there were similar analyses by Chen (1997). In fact, 
 of our models correspond to   of Chen (1997), respectively. So we 
make the following remark (See Appendix for details). 
A A p p , , 0
A
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Remark: Chen (1997). When both firms use discriminatory pricing (DP, DP), there is a unique 
Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium prices are: 
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Chen (1997) shows that, for (DP, DP), each firm’s equilibrium price is independent of its 
market share in the previous period. On the other hand, for (UP, UP), each firm’s equilibrium 
price depends on its existing market shares, ( α α − 1    , ). The results also show that   if 
and only if 
* *
B A p p ≥
2 / 1 ≥ α , that is, the firm with higher market shares sets higher prices and places 
weight on securing profits from existing customers, while the firm with lower market share sets 
lower prices and attempts poaching to attract customers from the rival firm. 
Thirdly, we consider the asymmetric case of (DP, UP) where firm A carries out price 
discrimination and firm B uses a policy of uniform pricing. The consumer who has bought from 
firm A in the previous period (the previous customer of firm A) is indifferent between 
continuing to buy from firm A and switching to buy from firm B, if her switching costs s 
satisfy the condition . Similarly, the previous customer of firm B is indifferent 
between remaining and switching, if her switching costs s satisfy the condit
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B BA p p s − = . In this instance, there exist some switchers from firm A to firm B and other 
switchers who switch from firm B to firm A. 
We can see that in the equilibrium it must hold that  N 0 . In contradiction, if 
0 , then every previous customer of firm A does not switch to firm B, hence there is an 
incentive for firm A to raise price  0 . Similarly, if  N , then every previous customer of 
firm B does not switch to firm B, hence there is an incentive for firm B to raise price  . Here, 
if  , then each firm’s profit ( and ) in this period is given by, respectively: 
A B A p p p ≥ ≥
B p
A B p p >
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In stage two of the game, each firm maximizes its profits with respect to prices, taking the 
previous market shares  α α − 1    and    , and the other firm’s price as given. The following 
roposition summarizes the equilibrium in the asymmetric case.  p
 
Proposition 1 When firm A practices discriminatory pricing and firm B uses uniform pricing 
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Similarly, when firm A practices uniform pricing and firm B uses discriminatory pricing (UP, 
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  3  4
roof. From the first-order conditions for profit maximization it is easy to derive the results. 
The Appendix for
)
wer price for new customers  set by the non- 
disc
 prices given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) into the 
profit functions, we obtain the equilibrium profits as follows. 
In the case of discriminatory pricing: 
P
 second-order conditions are satisfied (See   details). 
 
The discriminating firm sets a higher price *) or    * ( 0 0
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profits. Then we derive the following proposition. 
roposition 2 If there is a large difference in market shares, or formally either  5 1 0 < <α  or 
1 5 4 < <α  is satisfied, then (DP, DP) is a unique Na  
c.Otherwise (i.e., 
sh equilibrium regardless of the value of
5 4 5 1 ≤ ≤α ), there  gy eq d (UP, U , 
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d are the probabilities of firms A and B exercising price discrimi an  * q  ]) 1 , 0 [ (∈ nation, 
respectively. 
 
Proof. Suppose that firm A uses DP with probability  p and UP with probability  1 ( ) p − , and 
firm B uses DP with probability  and UP with probability  q ) 1 ( q − . First, we consider the case 
in which  , that is, 
B A p p ≥ 2. Then the expected profit of firm A is given by:  1 ≥ α
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Firm A chooses the probability  p  that maximizes its expected profit for a given probability 
The expected profit of firm B is given by: 
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irm B chooses the probability  that maximizes its expected profit for a given probability q   p .  F
Then it is easy to show that the best response functions are given by: 
 
p=
0i f   q<q *
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= q . From the best response functions we 
have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium  ) if 
 
(DP, DP 1 5 4 < <α , and
one mixed
 we have two pure-strategy 
equilibria (DP, DP) and (UP, UP) and  -strategy if  5 4 2 1 ≤ ≤α . The same argument 
can be applied to the case in which 
B A p p < , that is,  2 1 < α . Then we have a unique 
ure-strategy equilibrium (DP, DP) if p   5 1 0 < <α , and we have two pure-strategy equilibria 
(DP, DP) and (UP, UP) and one mixed-strategy equilibrium if  2 1 5 1 < ≤α . QED. 
 
Interestingly, our results are in direct contrast to the current state of the literature on 
stra
customers ually this 
tegic pricing policies. For example, in a static duopoly model on spatial pricing policies, 
Thisse and Vives (1988) show that price discrimination is the dominant strategy for both firms. 
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. If one firm engages in DP and tries to 
poach customers from its competitor by offering them special discounts, then the other firm 
should respond to retain its customers. In this case, it is more profitable for the other firm to also 
engage in DP than it is to respond by lowering its price uniformly for all customers under UP. 
Assuming each firm has existing customers, DP is the best-response strategy for each firm 
against other firm’s DP. Thus, (DP, DP) is one of the equilibria. On the other hand, suppose that 
one firm engages in UP. If the other firm also employs UP, then it allows firms to relax their 
price competition, thereby raising prices and earning higher profits on their partially locked-in 
. Us is profitable for each firm, and so (UP, UP) is another equilibrium. 
However, when there is an extremely large difference in the existing market shares, i.e., 
5 1 0 < <α  or  1 5 4 < <α , the equilibrium outcome is different. Then, a smaller firm has a 
greater incentive to employ DP and tries to poach customers from its competitor, regardless of 
e rival firm’s pricing policy. That is, DP is a dominant strategy for a smaller firm. In this case, 
roposition 3 Regardless of the values of  and 
th
(DP, DP) is a unique equilibrium. 
 
P c α , both firms’ equilibrium profits are lower 
Pro
under (DP, DP) than under (UP, UP). 
 
of. Comparing the profits, it is easy to prove this proposition (See Appendix for details). 
 
Unlike the monopoly case, competitive price discrimination intensifies competition, and 
the profits of each firm will be lower than if none of the firms practice price discrimination. 
This result is similar to results found in the analysis involving coupon-based price 
discrimination carried out by Bester and Petrakis (1996), the poaching analysis carried out by 
Chen (1997), and the analysis of loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes by Caminal and Claici 
(2007). The result comes from the fact that firms differ in their view of which markets are   6
ct by offering a lower price to these customers, with the result that prices for 
very group may be lower than the uniform price. This escalation of competition may make 
firms worse off. 
 
firms worse off. However, 
hen there is not so large difference of market shares in recent years, such a discriminatory 
pricing becomes rare. These facts coincide with our propositions. 
ester, H. and Petrakis, E. (1996) “Coupons and oligopolistic price discrimination”   
aminal R. and Claici, A. (2007) “Are loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes anti-competitive?” 
hen, Y. (1997) “Paying customers to switch” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
orts, K.S. (1998) “Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly: all-out competition and 
and Zhang, Z. J. (2000) “Pay to switch or pay to stay: preference-based price 
iscrimination in markets with switching costs” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
aylor, C.R. (2003) “Supplier surfing: competition and consumer behavior in subscription 
hisse, J.F. and Vives, X. (1988) “On the strategic choice of spatial price policy” American 
conomic Review 78, 122-137.  
 
Appendix 
strong and which are weak, i.e., the “best-response asymmetry” termed by Corts (1998). In our 
model of customers’ switching costs, each firm has a “strong market” of its own partially 
locked-in customers, preferring to set a higher price in this market than in the “weak market” of 
rival’s customers. Thus, the two firms have different strong markets. When price discrimination 
is permitted and some firm offers a lower price to its competitor’s customers, we would expect 
a rival firm to rea
e
4. Implication 
We have considered the behavior-based price discrimination in a duopoly market with 
switching costs. The analysis in this paper has been applied to several areas. To the extent that 
the firms have information about consumers’ purchase histories, it may be possible for firms to 
engage in behavior-based price discrimination. We think our results are most applicable to the 
mobile telephone market. From the beginning,  when NTT DoCoMo dominated the market, this 
market has been characterized by such practices as selling mobile telephones to new customers 
for one yen (approximately, one cent) and other examples of price discrimination. These efforts 
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Proof of Remark   7
In the case of (DP, DP), the first-order conditions for firm i are given by: 
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Solving the first-order conditions, we can derive the Nash equilibrium prices: 
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Furthermore, concerning these equilibrium prices, it can be easily shown that 
he case of (UP, UP). When  , the first-order conditions for firm 
A and B are given by: 
   , 1 * * 0 ≤ − N
A p p and . 1 * * 0 0 ≤ − ≤
A
N
B p p   
Next, we consider t
0 ≤
B
B A p p ≥
0 ) 2 ( 1     , 0 ) 2 1 ( = + − + − =
∂ ∂ p p
B A
∂
= + + − =
∂














) 2 ( ) 1 (




+ = + = c p c p
+ B A , 
where the second-order conditions: 

















are satisfied. Here, in order to satisfy , it must hold that:    * *
B A p p ≥
0
3








Therefore,    if and only if  * *
B A p p ≥ 2 / 1 ≥ α . Furthermore, concerning these equilibrium 
prices, it holds that  0 *) * ≥ −
B A p p ( 1− , because  0
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Proof of Proposition 1 
When firm A practices discriminatory pricing and firm B uses uniform pricing (DP, UP), the 
first-order conditions for firm i are given by: . 0 ) 2 ( ) 2 1 )( 1 (
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where the second-order conditions: 
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are satisfied. Concerning the equilibrium prices, it holds that  . The 
relationships between them can easily be established as follows: 
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It also holds that   and    *), * ( 1 0
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Furthermore, the equilibrium prices of (UP, DP) case can be derived in a similar way. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
We can show that: 
when  ,  1 1/2 or     < ≤ ≥ α
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Therefore, Proposition 3 holds. 
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